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HAIR’S THE THING:  TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AND FORCED 
PERFORMANCE OF RACE THROUGH RACIALLY CONSCIOUS 
PUBLIC SCHOOL HAIRSTYLE PROHIBITIONS 
Anna-Lisa F. Macon∗ 
“The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more 
vital than in the community of American schools.” 
Justice Potter Stewart1 
INTRODUCTION 
Something peculiar is happening in American schools.  This 
something is an addendum to primary and secondary school dress 
codes that seems simultaneously outrageous and justifiable.  Ameri-
can schools have historically dictated or regulated student dress.  
They have also placed restrictions on hair length and style, particular-
ly for boys.2  However, these polices have recently found a new target:  
Black children.3  Primary schools in Oklahoma,4 Ohio,5 and Florida6 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 2012, Brandeis Universi-
ty. Special thanks to Professors Kermit Roosevelt and Dorothy Roberts for their insight, 
members of the University of Pennsylvania Black Law Students Association for their en-
thusiasm, the staff of the Journal of Constitutional Law for their diligence, and to Ava-Lisa 
and Randle Macon for surviving numerous phone calls and drafts. 
 1 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (finding a statute requiring public school 
teachers to disclose all affiliations and organizational memberships as a pre-requisite to 
employment unconstitutional). 
 2 See generally Recent Cases, Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 
U.S. 937 (1970); Stevenson v. Board of Education, 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 957 (1970), 84 HARV. L. REV. 1702 (1971) (analyzing the increased trend in liti-
gation contesting school bans on long hair). 
 3 I use “Black” to represent “African-Americans,” “Caribbean-Americans,” and all other in-
dividuals who are perceived or self-identify as part of the African Diaspora.  As White 
Americans are not forced to state their place of origin as a means of self-identification 
(i.e., European-American, Italian-American, etc.), I see no reason to impose such a system 
on those of African descent. 
 4 The Deborah Brown Community School in Tulsa, Oklahoma sent seven-year-old Tiana 
Parker (a Black female) home from school for wearing her hair in tidy dreadlocks.  The 
school’s dress code policy states that “hairstyles such as dreadlocks, afros, mohawks, and 
other faddish styles are unacceptable.” Rebecca Klein, Tiana Parker, 7, Switches Schools After 
Being Forbidden From Wearing Dreads, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 5, 2013),                        
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have banned natural Black hairstyles or have threatened Black female 
students who wear their hair naturally with expulsion.  An Ohio 
school attempted to ban “afro-puffs and small twisted braids.”7  A sev-
en-year-old in Oklahoma was forced to switch schools after being sus-
pended for wearing dreadlocks.8  In Milwaukee, a teacher punished a 
Black first grader by cutting off one of her braids in front of the class 
and throwing it in the trash.9 
Excepting the final example, which is (hopefully) a clear-cut case 
of assault,10 proper resolution of these school policies is legally am-
biguous.  Though none of these cases resulted in litigation (likely be-
cause the schools backed down after nationwide publicity and public 
backlash), racially conscious school dress code policies that prohibit 
Black hairstyles are becoming increasingly prevalent.11 
This Comment addresses two questions that logically flow from 
consideration of this trend.  First, can state-funded primary and sec-
ondary schools legally ban natural Black hair and Black ethnic hair-
styles?  Second, regardless of the answer to the first question, should 
these schools be allowed to ban them?  Because there is no definitive 
 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/05/tiana-parker-dreads_n_3873868.html 
(emphasis added).  Tiana was forced to transfer schools to protect her hair.  Id. 
 5 Horizon Science Academy in Loraine, Ohio updated its school policy to prohibit certain 
Black hairstyles.  In a letter sent to parents, the school stated, “afro-puffs and small twisted 
braids, with or without rubber bands are NOT permitted.”  Rebecca Klein, Ohio School 
Apologizes After Attempting To Ban ‘Afro-Puffs’ and ‘Twisted Braids’, HUFFINGTON POST (June 
25, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/25/ohio-school-afro-puff-horizon-
science-academy_n_3498954.html.  The school rescinded the ban and issued an apology 
in response to swift public backlash.  Many parents viewed the policy as racist.  Id. 
 6 Faith Christian Academy in Orlando, Florida threatened to expel twelve-year-old Vanessa 
VanDyke (a Black female) unless she cut her natural afro.  Shaun Chaiyabhat, Update:  Af-
rican-American girl won’t face expulsion over ‘natural hair’, CLICK ORLANDO (Dec. 24, 2013, 
5:44PM), http://www.clickorlando.com/news/africanamerican-girl-faces-expulsion-over-
natural-hair/-/1637132/23159400/-/ajs6jbz/-/index.html. 
 7 See Klein, supra note 5. 
 8 See Klein, supra note 4. 
 9 At Congress Elementary School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin a first grade teacher cut three 
inches of hair from seven-year-old Lamya Cammon’s braid with classroom scissors.  The 
teacher was frustrated that Lamya kept playing with her hair and reportedly threatened 
that “if you keep doing it, I am going to cut some more.”  Taki S. Raton, Teacher in Braid 
Cutting Incident Suspended, MILWAUKEE COMMUNITY J. (Mar. 26, 2010), http://
www.communityjournal.net/teacher-in-braid-cutting-incident-suspended/.  The teacher 
threw the braid in the trash and sent Lamya back to her desk in tears while her classmates 
laughed at her.  A week after the incident, the teacher was still teaching and Lamya was 
transferred to a different classroom as if she had done something wrong.  Id. 
 10 The District Attorney’s office issued the teacher a $175 fine for disorderly conduct and 
the Milwaukee school system initiated a disciplinary action against the teacher.  As of 
March 26, 2010 (four months after the incident) the teacher was suspended without pay.  
See id. 
 11 See generally supra notes 4−6, 9 (providing examples of school regulations on hairstyles). 
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legal answer as to whether state-funded primary and secondary 
schools can prohibit Black ethnic hairstyles, this Comment will utilize 
sociological inquiry and legal analysis to make its own determination.  
First, examination of social and psychological harms caused by these 
regulations demonstrates the importance of sheltering Black children 
from forced acquiescence to White social norms.  Next, reviewing 
case law regarding public schools’ regulation of boys’ hair length, 
hair length discrimination as cultural discrimination, and ethnic hair-
style restrictions in an employment context provides a historical 
backdrop that parallels this Comment’s inquiry and reveals why judi-
cial intervention in this area is needed.  Finally, dissection of the Su-
preme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurispru-
dence offers a solution to this unsavory violation of student rights. 
The facts surrounding Vanessa VanDyke’s12 struggle are illustrative 
in framing this inquiry.  The Huffington Post, apparently unable to put 
its finger on exactly what was wrong with Vanessa VanDyke’s immi-
nent expulsion, classified her story under its “Weird News” section.13  
Reportedly, the twelve-year-old VanDyke was being bullied at school 
because she wore her hair in a natural afro.14  When VanDyke finally 
informed school administrators about the bullying, the school re-
sponded not by chastising the offenders, but by terming her hair a 
“distraction” and giving VanDyke and her parents an ultimatum.15  
The twelve year old could either “cut and shape her natural hair or 
be expelled.”16  VanDyke’s parents were livid and approached local 
news media with their story.17 
In the wake of a national outcry spurred by media coverage, 
school administrators amended their position.18  School officials stat-
ed, “we’re not asking [VanDyke] to put products in her hair or cut 
 
 12 Though Vanessa VanDyke attended a private school (i.e., not a public-funded education-
al institution), her story is evocative of the structural injustice causing school administra-
tors to prohibit Black ethnic hairstyles, and adds great value to this discussion. 
 13 See Vanessa VanDyke Could Be Expelled After Having Her Hair Mocked, HUFFINGTON POST  
(Nov. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Vanessa VanDyke Could Be Expelled], http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/vanessa-vandyke-expelled_n_4345326.html. 
 14 See Fran Jeffries, Report:  African-American Girl Won’t Be Expelled Over Her Natural Hairstyle, 
THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, (Nov. 26, 2013, 3:47PM), http://www.ajc.com/
news/news/report-african-american-girl-faces-expulsion-over-/nb5M7/. 
 15 See Vanessa VanDyke Could Be Expelled, supra note 13. 
 16 See Jeffries, supra note 14. 
 17 See Chaiyabhat, supra note 6 (expressing VanDyke’s mother’s anger concerning the 
school’s actions). 
 18 Id. (reporting that the school’s response was to say they did not ask VanDyke to put prod-
ucts in or cut her hair but “to style her hair within the guidelines according to the school 
handbook”). 
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her hair.  We’re asking her to style her hair within the guidelines ac-
cording to the school handbook.”19 
The student handbook states “[h]air must be a natural color and 
must not be a distraction”; prohibited hairstyles “include but [are] 
not limited to:  mohawks, shaved designs, and rat tails, etc.”20  The 
handbook seems reasonable enough, but school administrators faced 
a major problem in its application against Vanessa VanDyke:  she was 
not purposefully styling her hair in a prohibited hairstyle.  She was 
letting it grow naturally from her head.21  When VanDyke’s peers bul-
lied her because of her natural hair, the school labeled her a “distrac-
tion” and suspended her.22  Unfortunately, there are currently no 
clear legal standards that prohibit schools from engaging in this type 
of behavior. 
In order to protect Black children’s rights, Americans must rec-
ognize that physical and cultural traits, such as hair texture and hair-
style, are increasingly used as a proxy for race.  School dress code pol-
icies that prohibit ethnically Black hairstyles have two fundamental 
issues.  The first is a devaluation of racially-constructed “Blackness.”  
Prohibition of Black traits has become a politically palatable way of 
devaluing the Black body.  In the same way boys’ hair length regula-
tions implicitly devalue a feminized attribute (having long hair), the 
prohibition of cornrows, afros, dreadlocks, and other ethnically Black 
hairstyles implicitly devalues Black persons and Black culture.  Sec-
ondly, these dress code policies target and disproportionately affect 
Black children while appearing to be facially neutral rules.  On paper, 
banning cornrows might affect all students equally, but if cornrows 
are almost exclusively worn by Black children then the ban, in fact, 
primarily affects this racial minority group. 
To combat school dress codes that are racist implicitly and in ef-
fect, courts must reinvigorate Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion.  To protect vulnerable populations, Americans must recognize 
trait discrimination for what it is:  a mere proxy for race discrimina-
tion. 
 
 19 Jeffries, supra note 14 (emphasis added). 
 20 FAITH CHRISTIAN ACADEMY, STUDENT HANDBOOK 2012/2013 4, available at                 
http://www.fcalions.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/FCA-Large-Student-Handbook-
12-13.pdf. 
 21 See Jeffries, supra note 14 (“An African-American girl who said she was told to cut and 
shape her natural hair or be expelled won’t be booted from her Orlando private school 
after all, according to a news report.” (emphasis added)). 
 22 See Vanessa VanDyke Could Be Expelled, supra note 13 (noting that VanDyke complained of 
being teased and the school’s response). 
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I.  DETANGLING THE POLITICS OF RACIALLY CONSCIOUS DRESS CODES 
A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF RACIAL BIAS, TRAIT DISCRIMINATION, 
AND CULTURAL ASSIMILATION 
Nowhere is the cultural construction of race in America more ap-
parent than in the case of Alexina Morrison, “kidnapped” slave and 
self-professed White woman.23  In 1857, Alexina ran away from her 
master and convinced the local parish jailer (William Dennison, a 
White man) that she was a White woman who had been kidnapped 
into slavery.24  Dennison took Alexina home and introduced her to 
White society, taking her to “balls and other amusements with his 
family.”25  With the help of Dennison and his community, she sued 
her master for her freedom.26  Though Alexina could certainly pass 
for White with her “blue eyes and flaxen hair,” this was not the main 
argument her new friends and neighbors made on her behalf at tri-
al.27 
Alexina’s witnesses assured the jury that she had fit in perfectly at their 
balls, that she had slept in their beds with their daughters, and that they 
surely would have known if she had a drop of African blood. . . .  Several 
doctors testified on her behalf that the shape of her hair follicles and the 
arches of her feet proved her Whiteness. 28 
Though Alexina’s physical appearance was a necessary condition 
to establish her Whiteness, she also had to prove her conduct was 
White to win at trial.29  Skin color, though highly visible, was only one 
aspect of race.30  Consideration of multiple traits—physical, social, 
and cultural—went into a determination of whether someone was 
Black or White.31 
The slave master’s defense is just as telling.  In addition to provid-
ing documentation to prove Alexina was a slave of the Morrison fami-
ly, he used scientific language to show that race “could not [be] dis-
covered through appearances, [but was] something that required expertise 
to discern.” 32  Alexina’s alleged slave master attacked her “White char-
 
 23 See ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL:  A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA 
1 (2008). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 1–2. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
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acter” to prove her “negro blood.”33  Indeed, the slave master 
“call[ed] her sexual virtue into doubt . . . and question[ed] her wit-
nesses about her behavior at public balls.”34  Despite these tactics, 
Alexina ultimately prevailed.35  Though she “was undoubtedly a slave, 
and almost certainly had some African ancestry, she repeatedly won 
over White jurors . . . [by] perform[ing] the role of a White woman, 
and convince[ing] others of her moral worthiness.”36 
Over 150 years after Alexina’s fight for freedom, the concept of 
race in America remains relatively unchanged.  People still believe race 
is about more than skin color.  Race lies in performance of certain 
racially-coded actions and attributes.  A study on racial stereotypes in 
the early 1930s found that “Whites were viewed as smart, industrious, 
and ambitious, whereas Blacks were viewed as ignorant, lazy, and 
happy-go-lucky.”37  Though such blatant racism against Blacks has 
largely faded, modern racism remains and is characterized by more 
subtle and insidious racial biases.38  Studies from the late 1980s and 
1990s suggest that “[n]on-Blacks exhibit subtle racism when it is safe 
and socially acceptable to do so, or when the racism is easily rational-
ized.”39  Blacks and non-Blacks alike are indoctrinated with negative 
stereotypes about Black people and Black culture, simply by virtue of 
growing up in the United States.40  Additionally, “Implicit Association 
Tests (IATs) provide compelling evidence that many Whites [still] 
hold negative stereotypes that are frequently associated with Blacks.”41 
 
 33 Id. at 2. 
 34 Id. at 2. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 3. 
 37 Ashleigh Shelby Rosette & Tracy L. Dumas, The Hair Dilemma:  Conform to Mainstream Ex-
pectations or Emphasize Racial Identity, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 407, 413 (2007). 
 38 Id. (“[T]his blatant racism was replaced by more subtle forms of negative biases—referred 
to as aversive racism, symbolic racism, and modern racism.”). 
 39 Id. at 413–14. 
 40 See id. at 414 (“[T]hey all agree that merely by growing up in the United States, Whites 
learn of the negative stereotypes associated with Blacks from their parents, peers, culture, 
and society.  As a result of this upbringing, Whites frequently attach feelings of negative 
affect to Blacks.”). 
 41 Id.  Ashleigh Shelby Rosette and Tracy L. Dumas describe IATs in their article:  “In the 
IAT, participants sort Black and White faces and positive and negative words into their re-
spective columns.  One portion of the test mixes these stimuli, with the instruction to 
group White faces and positive words into one column, and to group Black faces and 
negative words into another.  Participants typically performed this task quickly and easi-
ly. . . . A subsequent part of the test switched these values, instructing participants to 
group White faces with negative words and Black faces with positive words.  Participants 
experienced a significant difference in response time and made more errors in grouping 
when asked to associate Black faces with positive words.”  Id. 
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Though race in America is a cultural creation rather than a bio-
logical reality,42 “[i]t is a brutal fact of life for millions of citizens, and 
an inescapable problem for the rest . . . .”43 This ingrained racial bias 
leads to the type of school policies that prohibited Vanessa VanDyke 
from proudly wearing her afro.  These policies are examples of trait 
discrimination that encourage physical and cultural assimilation to 
the dominant ideal.  The policies are, at their core, an effort to eradi-
cate Black physical and cultural traits and replace them with White 
ones. 
Suppose you are an employer preparing to interview a fictional 
young woman named Shaquanda Jackson.44  You only have a résumé, 
but you try to anticipate what she will be like.  What race is she?  How 
does she speak?  What type of clothes does she wear?  Is she skinny or 
fat?  Morally upright or wild and promiscuous?  What did you pre-
sume about her spelling and grammatical abilities after simply glanc-
ing at her name?  Most Americans have answers to those questions, 
based on experience, prejudice, or other seemingly justifiable rea-
sons.45  More likely than not, the answers to most or all of those ques-
tions have negative connotations.46  Despite being a name on a page, 
completely divorced from physical attributes and general conduct, 
Shaquanda Jackson is racialized.  Shaquanda Jackson is Black, and 
not in a good way.  But then, is “being Black” in an employment or 
educational setting ever a good thing? 
A trait is “a quality that makes one person or thing different from 
another.”47  When Americans see the name Shaquanda Jackson, and 
 
 42 See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION:  HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS 
RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 4 (2011) (discussing how race is a politi-
cal system rather than a biological category). 
 43 Laura Miller, Book Note, Are You White Enough?  From Jim Crow Laws to Workplace Discrimi-
nation, the History of Race and the American Courtroom Is Incendiary, 34 MONT. LAWYER 22, 22 
(2008) (reviewing ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL:  A HISTORY OF RACE ON 
TRIAL IN AMERICA (2008)). 
 44 A Google search for “Shaquanda” brings up a posted question in yahoo.com’s forum.  
The poster asks, “why do Black people have names like shaquanda, mortisha, lashanique, 
etc?”  The poster implies these names are ridiculous, and later wonders whether “they” 
[Black persons] give their children these names for cultural reasons.  This query and sub-
sequent responses typify negative connotations to Black linked traits like Black names.  See 
Why Do Black People Have Names Like Shaquanda, Mortisha, Lashanique, etc?, YAHOO! 
ANSWERS, http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20100616131705AAoMaDm 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2014). 
 45 See Rosette & Dumas, supra note 37, at 414 (“[M]erely by growing up in the United States, 
Whites learn of the negative stereotypes associated with Blacks from their parents, peers, 
culture, and society.”). 
 46 See id. (“Whites frequently attach feelings of negative affect to Blacks.”). 
 47 Trait Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/trait (last visited Jan. 27, 2014). 
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mentally distinguish her from others by designating her as a “Black 
person,” her very name becomes a trait associated with Blackness.  
Acknowledging this relationship is fundamental in understanding 
trait discrimination.  Americans hear a name like Shaquanda Jackson 
or see a hairstyle like dreadlocks, and mentally code both name and 
hairstyle as racially Black.  Trait discrimination takes this mental 
recognition a step further, by actively prohibiting speech, names, 
clothing, hairstyles, etc. that Americans mentally associate with a spe-
cific race.  Though Black persons are not born with dreadlocks or 
pre-destined to be named Shaquanda, these traits become avatars of 
Blackness.  Because race is such a real and tangible thing in American 
culture,48 these avatars cannot be separated from their racial signifi-
cance. 
Identification and prohibition of socially disfavored traits is an at-
tempt to culturally assimilate persons who have these unpalatable 
characteristics.  Racial biases cause Americans to associate Black per-
sons with negative attributes; as a result, characteristics associated 
with Black persons are imbued with these negative attributes.  Histor-
ically, this type of bias (coupled with the obvious economic and social 
incentives) resulted in Black enslavement49 and Black persons’ explic-
it relegation to the lower classes via Jim Crow laws.50 
But when the historical vehicles for explicitly degrading Black 
persons were prohibited by law, employers and society as a whole 
changed tactics.51  Americans stopped overtly stigmatizing race and 
started attacking traits associated with race.52  This social convention 
keeps Blacks who embody stereotypically Black traits in the socio-
political underclass,53 while allowing Blacks who perform “Whiteness” 
 
 48 ROBERTS, supra note 42, at 4. 
 49 The very Constitution of the United States acknowledges slavery via the Three-Fifths 
Compromise.  Though slavery was later abolished, its legacy continues to haunt U.S. race 
relations.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 50 After slavery was abolished in the United States, many states adopted a system of laws de-
signed to maintain White supremacy and enforce racial segregation between Blacks and 
Whites.  These laws are collectively known as Jim Crow laws.  See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., 
From Brown to Tulsa:  Defining Our Own Future, 47 HOW. L.J. 499, 500−501 (2004) (discuss-
ing the foundation of Brown). 
 51 See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination As Race Discrimination:  An Argument About 
Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365, 365–66 (2006) (“Title VII has been extremely ef-
fective at ending such blatant forms of status discrimination.  Discrimination today often 
takes a different and more complex form.  It may be driven, not by racial status per se, 
but by traits and attributes that are culturally or statistically associated with race.”). 
 52 Id. 
 53 PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION:  A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE 13, 
468–69 (Richard Nice trans.) (1984) (discussing how and why the social and cultural cap-
ital of wealthy and middle class persons are perpetuated). 
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(i.e., adopt enough “White” traits to be palatable and unobtrusive to 
culturally White society) to flourish.54 
Though performance of Whiteness is an accepted (if greatly re-
sented) part of succeeding in the United States, for Black persons, 
forced performance (also known as socially mandated cultural assimi-
lation) is of even greater concern.  By limiting Black children to hair-
styles that change, subdue, or materially alter their natural hair, state-
funded primary and secondary schools engage in race discrimination, 
using Black traits as a proxy for the disfavored racial group.  It is 
deeply and inherently wrong to inculcate Black persons (or any non-
White persons) with the understanding that their ethnicity and natu-
ral bodies are unpalatable, unprofessional, and unworthy.  Using 
state-sanctioned institutions (i.e., public schools and charter schools) 
to enforce this sense of physical and cultural inferiority upon chil-
dren, whose sense of self-worth and identity is still forming, is an even 
greater injustice.  Such injustice warrants protection through ade-
quate enforcement of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. 
II.  A BARBERSHOP AND A HAIR PIECE:  LESSONS LEARNED FROM MALE 
HAIR LENGTH REGULATIONS AND EMPLOYEE HAIRSTYLE PROHIBITIONS 
Before evaluating legal responses to a problem with few common 
law or statutory analogs, this Comment considers two parallel areas of 
jurisprudence:  male hair length restrictions and race-conscious em-
ployee hairstyle prohibitions.  Analysis of these cases reveals a need 
for both legal clarity and increased protection of rights, particularly 
for vulnerable populations like children and ethnic minorities.  I look 
first to cases evaluating the legitimacy of public school boys’ hair 
length regulations.  Examining relevant Supreme Court jurispru-
dence and varied responses by lower courts provides valuable insight 
into potential legal responses to our problem. 
 
 54 My understanding of “performing Whiteness” is heavily influenced by Law Professor Kenji 
Yoshino’s discussion of “covering” (i.e., retaining a visible trait that is socially unpalatable, 
but making this trait less obtrusive by engaging in conduct designed to deflect attention 
from it), and Pierre Bourdieu’s contention that certain cultural competencies are favored 
by society and reproduced by disfavored classes in hope of attaining social status.  See 
KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING:  THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 18 (2006) (adopt-
ing the term “covering” from sociologist Erving Goffman, who defines it as the downplay-
ing of one’s own traits so that others focus on different qualities); BOURDIEU, supra note 
53, at 468–69. 
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A.  Hair Length Discrimination as Sex Discrimination:  An Overview of Boys’ 
Hair Length Cases 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not determined whether schools can 
regulate students’ hair length and style.55  However, in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District, the Court considered 
whether public school students wearing black armbands in school to 
protest the Vietnam War violated the school dress code.56  In Tinker, 
primary and secondary public school students wore black armbands 
to school to protest the Vietnam War, in violation of a known school 
policy under which students who refused to remove these armbands 
when asked would be suspended.57  Though the Court distinguished 
the armband prohibition at issue from dress code regulations for at-
tire and hairstyle,58 the Court’s holding still provides guidance for in-
terpretation of school hairstyle regulations.  According to the Court, 
“where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the for-
bidden conduct [(here, wearing black armbands)] would ‘materially 
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate dis-
cipline in the operation of the school,’ the prohibition cannot be sus-
tained.”59 
However, the Supreme Court later backed away from the Tinker 
standard.60  In Morse v. Frederick, the Court allowed a principal to sus-
pend a student for displaying a banner reading, “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS,” at a school sponsored event.61  The Court found deterring 
illegal drug use was an important and compelling interest that war-
ranted restricting student speech.62  The Court held that Tinker’s 
“mode of analysis . . . is not absolute,” since the Court does not always 
 
 55 See Alison G. Myhra, No Shoes, No Shirt, No Education:  Dress Codes and Freedom of Expression 
Behind the Postmodern Schoolhouse Gates, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 337, 345 (1999) (stating 
that there is an absence of Supreme Court precedent regarding whether public schools 
can regulate student dress and appearance). 
 56 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 507–08 (“The problem posed by the present case does not relate to regulation of 
the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style, or deportment. . . .  Our problem 
involves direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to ‘pure speech.’”). 
 59 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 60 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (holding that a school principal did not 
violate a student’s First Amendment rights by confiscating a banner that promoted illegal 
drug use and suspending the student for ten days). 
 61 Id. at 397–98, 403. 
 62 Id. at 407. 
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conduct Tinker’s “substantial disruption” analysis.63  Ultimately, the 
Court supplemented Tinker without overturning it.  To restrict stu-
dents’ rights, schools must prove the prohibited behavior “‘materially 
and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school,’”64 or, that curbing certain 
activities serves an “‘important . . . [and] compelling’ interest.”65 
From Tinker and Morse, I glean two legal rules to evaluate the va-
lidity of public school dress code policies:  (1) whether schools have 
an important or compelling interest in restricting the student ac-
tion,66 and (2) whether the prohibited student action “materially and 
substantially disrupt[s] the work and discipline of the school.”67  The-
se tests are not mutually exclusive.68  Courts could use one or both to 
evaluate a public school dress code prohibition.69 
Based on the legal framework dictated by the Supreme Court, 
lower courts have come to a variety of different conclusions when ad-
judicating public school dress code restrictions on boys’ hair length.70  
“A bare majority of courts has held that school rules that absolutely 
prohibit a student from wearing long hair are unconstitutional.”71  
Only when the long hair satisfies one or both of the Supreme Court’s 
tests by causing disruption,72 or undermining an important or com-
pelling school interest,73 can these restrictions stand.  However, even 
taking these tests as given, there is rampant discord among courts as 
to their proper application in boys’ hair length cases.74  “Federal ap-
pellate courts in the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have 
invalidated such [dress code] rules; federal appellate courts in the 
Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, have upheld them.”75 
 
 63 Id. at 405.  A substantial disruption is one that “materially and substantially interfere[s] 
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”  Tinker, 
393 U.S. at 509, (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749). 
 64 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749). 
 65 Morse, 551 U.S. at 407. 
 66 See id (noting that deterring drug use is one such interest). 
 67 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
 68 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 405 (citing case law that shows that the First Amendment analysis 
varies in different cases and can apply both principles). 
 69 See id. (citing case law in which one or both principles were applied). 
 70 See generally 2 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 755 (2d ed. 2005) (noting 
the differences among the circuits on this topic). 
 71 Id. 
 72 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (holding that student conduct that disrupts classwork or in-
volves substantial disorder is not protected by the Constitution). 
 73 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 407 (holding the school’s action constitutional because deterring 
drug use was a compelling interest). 
 74 See generally KRAMER, supra note 70 (discussing the division among circuits in these cases). 
 75 Id. at 755−56. 
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Though a significant amount of case law based on First Amend-
ment protections, state regulations, and other constitutional rights 
exists in this area,76 this Comment will focus on Fourteenth Amend-
ment sex discrimination claims, as these cases most closely approxi-
mate responses to racially conscious dress codes.  Despite this focus, a 
distillation of the case law reveals a number of considerations that 
remain constant among the varied legal responses: 
In determining the constitutionality of a public school’s “grooming rule” 
that limits the length of boys’ hair, the outcome depends on balancing 
the male student’s right to be free from gender discrimination and the 
educational policy which the school seeks to further by teaching groom-
ing and hygiene, instilling discipline, maintaining order, and teaching 
respect for authority.  The outcome also depends on a showing as to 
whether the activity which the school is attempting to regulate (i.e., the 
wearing of long hair) is one which, if not regulated, will disrupt or mate-
rially interfere with the school’s mission to educate students . . . .77 
Unfortunately, some courts accord greater deference to public 
schools in determining and enforcing student hairstyle prohibitions 
than is warranted by the Supreme Court’s decisions.  The Fifth Cir-
cuit went so far as to adopt “a per se rule that such [school hairstyle] 
regulations are constitutionally valid.”78  In effect, the Fifth Circuit 
completely subordinated the constitutional rights of public primary 
and secondary school students to the whim of school authorities.  In 
Karr v. Schmidt, the Fifth Circuit declared,  
district courts need not hold . . . evidentiary hearing[s] [for these] cas-
es . . . . Where a complaint merely alleges the constitutional invalidity of a 
high school hair and grooming regulation, the district courts are di-
rected to grant an immediate motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim for which relief can be granted.79   
In this case, the Fifth Circuit denied the plaintiff’s Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection claim, and viewed judicial oversight of 
school hairstyle cases as a violation of federalism that sapped legiti-
mate state power.80  The Fifth Circuit refused to utilize a higher 
standard of scrutiny despite the policy’s unequal application between 
 
 76 See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Validity of Regulation by Public-School Authorities as to 
Clothes or Personal Appearance of Pupils, 58 A.L.R. 5th 1 (1998) (“This annotation collects 
and analyzes the cases discussing the substantive validity of the regulation of the clothing 
or personal appearance of public-school students, regardless of whether the regulation 
applies to students in general or only some subset of students, and regardless of whether 
the challenge to the regulation's validity is on its face or as applied.”). 
 77 2 KRAMER, supra note 70, at 756−57. 
 78 Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 617 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that there is no constitution-
ally protected right to determine the length and style of one’s hair in public high school). 
 79 Id. at 618. 
 80 Id. at 611, 616. 
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male and female students; female students were allowed to have long 
hair but male students were not.81  However, had the plaintiff alleged 
discrimination based on the suspect classification of race, the court 
would have been forced to apply a more “rigorous” standard of equal 
protection scrutiny.82 
Other courts, like the Seventh Circuit, recognize these policies as 
a sex-based denial of equal protection.83  In Crews v. Cloncs, the Sev-
enth Circuit directed a public high school in Indiana to admit a male 
student with long hair.84  The court found the school’s exclusion of 
the student “resulted primarily from a distaste for persons . . . who do 
not conform to society’s norms as perceived by [the school].”85  Be-
cause school administrators offered no reasons why health and safety 
objectives that preclude boys from having long hair were “not equally 
applicable to high school girls,” the school’s action constituted “deni-
al of [Fourteenth Amendment] equal protection to male students.”86  
Constitutional protection from racially conscious public school hair-
style prohibitions is a logical extension of the Seventh Circuit’s logic 
in Crews v. Cloncs and the Fifth Circuit’s concession in Karr v. Schmidt. 
B.  Hair Length Discrimination as Cultural Discrimination:  The Case of Ho 
Ah Kow v. Nunan 
Ho Ah Kow, a Chinese man living in California in the 1870s, did 
not need a barber.87  In accordance with a Chinese custom, Kow 
shaved the hair from the front of his head and wore the remainder in 
a braided queue.88  Shaving off the queue was considered a mark of 
disgrace and misfortune in his cultural tradition.89  In 1878, Kow was 
convicted under an unrelated lodging statute and imprisoned for five 
days in the county jail.90  During his imprisonment the local sheriff, 
the defendant, cut off Kow’s queue with full knowledge of the cultur-
 
 81 Id. at 616 (noting that the classification at hand not based on a suspect criterion such as 
“race or wealth”). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1266 (7th Cir. 1970) (holding that a public school hair-
style prohibition for male students was a violation of male students’ constitutional rights 
on the theory of sex-based discrimination). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 253 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546). 
 88 See id. (describing Kow’s hairstyle and the Chinese custom). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
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al implications of this act.91  The sheriff cut Kow’s queue in accord-
ance with a local ordinance that required “every male person impris-
oned in the county jail . . . [to] have the hair of his head ‘cut or 
clipped to a uniform length of one inch from the scalp . . . .’”92 Un-
impressed by the ordinance, Kow sued the sheriff for “imposing a de-
grading and cruel punishment upon a class of persons who are enti-
tled . . . to the equal protection of the laws.”93 
The court agreed with Kow, dismissing the defendant’s health and 
disciplinary justifications for the ordinance as “mere pretense.”94  The 
ordinance was colloquially known as the “Queue Ordinance” and was 
only enforced against Chinese men.95  Though the ordinance was ex-
pressed in general terms, it had the effect of harming Chinese men.96  
According to the court, “[m]any illustrations might be given where 
ordinances, general in their terms, would operate only upon a special 
class . . . with exceptional severity, and thus incur the odium and be 
subject to . . . legal objection . . . .”97 Facially neutral policies enacted 
to harm a class of racial minorities are not legal based on equal pro-
tection analysis.98  Surely a general policy banning Black hairstyles, 
that school administrators must know primarily harms their Black 
pupils, would incur the rancor of this court as the Queue Ordinance 
did long ago, and cannot be legal. 
C.  Black ≠ Professional:  How Courts Have Allowed Systematic Devaluation 
of Blacks and Black Culture Through Employee Hairstyle Prohibitions 
This Comment next looks to racially conscious hairstyle prohibi-
tions in an employment context, via examination of Pitts v. Wild Ad-
ventures99 and Rogers v. American Airlines.100  Though courts largely fail 
 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 254. 
 95 Id. at 255. 
 96 Id. (“The class character of this legislation is none the less manifest because of the gen-
eral terms in which it is expressed.”). 
 97 Id.  
 98 Id. at 255 (“[W]here an ordinance, though general in its terms, only operates upon a spe-
cial race, sect, or class, it being universally understood that it is to be enforced only 
against that race, sect, or class, we may justly conclude that it was the intention of that 
body adopting it that it should only have such operation, and treat it accordingly.”). 
 99 No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008). 
100 527 F.Supp. 229, 232–33 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that American Airlines’ decision to 
prohibit all-braided hairstyles was permissible because the policy applied equally to all 
employees, and that the policy did not violate the Black female plaintiff’s constitutional 
rights).  My treatment of Rogers in this Comment will be brief in light of the extensive 
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to recognize and protect harm caused by employee hairstyle prohibi-
tions,101 the rich body of legal critique102 spawned by such decisions 
will guide this discussion. 
In Pitts, the plaintiff, a Black female, worked as a Guest Services 
Supervisor for the defendant/employer Wild Adventures.103  The 
plaintiff’s boss, a White female, “disapproved of [plaintiff’s] cornrow 
hairstyle” and told the plaintiff to “get her hair done in a ‘pretty 
style.’”104  Plaintiff catered to her manager’s wishes by styling her hair 
in “two strand twists,” but her manager disapproved of this new hair-
style as well because it “had the look of dreadlocks.”105 
Plaintiff refused to restyle her hair again because the defendant 
did not have a written hairstyle policy at the time.106  In response, the 
defendant issued a memo prohibiting “‘dreadlocks, cornrows, beads, 
and shells’ that are not ‘covered by a hat/visor.’”107  Plaintiff filed a 
complaint with the defendant’s human resources department, filed 
an EEOC complaint, and later started litigation because she believed 
the company’s grooming policy was racially discriminatory as it pro-
hibited only “Afrocentric” hairstyles.108 
In denying plaintiff’s argument that the grooming policy dispar-
ately impacted Black employees, the court found she could not 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination (under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964) by showing that:  (1) she is a member of a protected 
class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) similarly situat-
ed employees outside of her protected class were treated more favorably; 
and (4) she was qualified to do the job.109 
 
body of legal commentary focused on this case.  For deeper analysis of the Rogers deci-
sion, see infra note 102. 
101 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece:  Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title 
VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1093–94 (2010) (stating that courts often uphold employer bans 
on natural Black hairstyles). 
102 The Rogers decision, for example, has enjoyed extensive treatment by feminist and legal 
theorists.  See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece:  Perspectives on the Intersection of Race 
and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 370 (1991) (examining Rogers and hairstyle discrimina-
tion and its relation to broader race and gender discrimination); D. Wendy Greene, Black 
Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair . . . in the Workplace, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 405, 407 
(2011) (same); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 101, at 1093 (same); Michelle L. Turner, The 
Braided Uproar:  A Defense of My Sister’s Hair and A Contemporary Indictment of Rogers v. 
American Airlines, 7 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 115, 162 (2001) (same). 





108 Id. at *1, *3. 
109 Id. at *4. 
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The court concluded the plaintiff was not discriminated against 
based on her race,110 since “[g]rooming policies are typically outside 
the scope of federal employment discrimination statutes because they 
do not discriminate on the basis of immutable characteristics.”111  
This determination is flawed in that it presumes the necessity of pro-
tective hairstyles is not an “immutable characteristic” for certain hair 
textures, and forces Black women to adopt hairstyles that damage 
their hair. 
This approach is similar to the one used in the Rogers decision, 
where the court upheld an American Airlines’ grooming policy that 
prohibited certain ethnic hairstyles.112  Because an all-braided hair-
style was not a “natural” state for hair, the court found American Air-
lines could prohibit flight attendants from wearing braids.113  Further, 
“[t]he court in Rogers referred to all-braided hairstyles as ‘not [being] 
the product of natural hair growth but of artifice’ and then, in the 
same breath, offered American Airlines’ suggestion for [plaintiff] to 
use a hairpiece as an alternative for her in covering up her naturally 
grown hair.”114  “Such language exposes the court’s incomplete un-
derstanding of the full implications of tightly coiled and kinky hair 
for [B]lack women in the United States.”115  In essence, the Pitts 
court, like the Rogers court, based its reasoning on the faulty premise 
that White hair textures are “natural” for all people. 
The Rogers court explicitly favored White hair textures through its 
suggestion “that the use of a ponytail of straight, artificial hair was an 
appropriate alternative to the all-braided hairstyle that it called ‘arti-
fice.’”116  Further, by suggesting the plaintiff in Rogers could easily pull 
her hair back in a bun, as White women can, the court demonstrated 
a fundamental misunderstanding of hair diversity that varies from the 
norm.117  Most importantly, the Rogers court “rejected what Blacks 
identify as a natural hairstyle—a hairstyle that allows Black women to 
wear their hair down and long while retaining the natural structure 
and texture of their hair.”118  Though there are a wide variety of hair 
 
110 Id. at *5. 
111 Id. 
112 Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
113 Id. at 232. 
114 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 101, at 1093 (quoting Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232–33). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 See generally id. (“In reality, it is extremely difficult to get natural, tightly coiled and kinky 
hair to stay down and pull it back into a bun.”). 
118 Id. 
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types and textures within the Black community (and outside of it),119 
the Rogers and Pitts courts did not acknowledge hairstyles or hair tex-
tures outside of the “natural” White norm. 
In addition to the courts’ illogical assumption that there is a base-
line “natural” hair texture, the Rogers and Wild Adventures decisions 
raise the question of “why Black women are put to the task of justify-
ing a hairstyle particular to their culture when White women and 
even Black men are not.”120  Racially conscious hairstyle prohibitions 
by employers “degrade[] and de-legitimize[] Black women by deny-
ing them the right to self-expression and determination . . . .  
[D]eclaring a hairstyle as categorically unprofessional and unac-
ceptable degrades the class of people that view the hairstyle as a sym-
bol of ethnic pride.”121  Court decisions like Rogers and Pitts must be 
overturned to protect the bodies and identities of Black Americans. 
III.  HAIR WE GO:  REINVIGORATING FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL 
PROTECTION TO PROVIDE SOLUTIONS FOR STATE-FUNDED 
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
How then, can Americans help the children of Alexina Morrison 
feel comfortable in their own skin, hair, and culture?  How can a 
supposedly post-racial society help Black boys and girls combat their 
“proud” American heritage:  the indoctrination of White cultural and 
social supremacy through state-funded education?  Though the Su-
preme Court has not specifically addressed the constitutionality of 
public school hairstyle restrictions, Justice William Douglas made his 
opinion on the matter clear.122  “It seems incredible that under our 
federalism a State can deny a student education in its public school 
system unless his [or her] hair style comports with the standards of 
the school board.”123  “Hair style,” he continued, “is highly personal, 
an idiosyncrasy which I had assumed was left to family or individual 
 
119 This website alone logs four different categories of curl patterns for Black women, with a 
variety of subtypes within each category.  It is a legal fallacy for a court to determine that 
certain hairstyles are “unnatural” for particular hair types.  See Black Girl With Long Hair, 
Natural Hair Type Guide:  Which Type are You?, BGLH (Mar. 27, 2012), 
http://www.Blackgirllonghair.com/2012/03/natural-hair-type-guide-which-type-are-you/ 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (examining a variety of natural hair types). 
120 Turner, supra note 102, at 162. 
121 Id. 
122 See Miller, supra note 76 (discussing Douglas’s views).  
123 Olff v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 404 U.S. 1042, 1042 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(arguing against the denial of petitioner’s request of a writ of certiorari in regards to a 
case concerning boys’ hair length regulation in public school). 
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control and was of no legitimate concern to the State.”124  Justice 
Douglas’s thoughtful and impassioned reasoning guides this discus-
sion of legal remedies to the plight of Vanessa VanDyke and other 
similarly situated ethnic minorities—children whose bodies are a bat-
tle ground for assimilation to the White cultural norm. 
Still, making the case for legal protection is no easy task.  The ma-
jority of schools that contemplated or implemented racially conscious 
student hairstyle prohibitions were charter schools.125  Policing char-
ter schools is sometimes difficult, as these schools straddle the line 
between public and private.126  Charter schools receive government 
funding while enjoying increased autonomy (like private schools) in 
return for high academic performance.127  The distinction between 
public and private is extremely important.  If charter schools are pub-
lic schools, they are state actors and Fourteenth Amendment protec-
tions extend to students.128  If charter schools are private entities, stu-
dent rights are much more limited because the Fourteenth 
Amendment only protects individuals from state actors.129  In advocat-
ing possible solutions to racially conscious student hairstyle prohibi-
tions, I contend that charter schools are, or should be, state actors for 
purposes of student-focused equal protection litigation.  After estab-
lishing the applicability of this constitutional protection, we will look 
to Fourteenth Amendment equal protection to end this cultural war 
against Black children. 
A.  Charter Schools as Public Schools for Purposes of Student-Focused Equal 
Protection Litigation 
The charter school state actor debate is based on the language of 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  When a U.S. citizen is deprived of “rights, privileg-
es, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] law” by a 
private actor working “under color” of state law, the deprived party 
 
124 Id. 
125 See supra notes 4–6. 
126 See Jennifer Rose Jacoby, Race-Conscious Charter Schools and the Antibalkinization Perspective of 
Equal Protection, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1561, 1568 (2013) (discussing the nature of charter 
schools). 
127 See id. (discussing the funding of charter schools and the conditional exemptions they 
enjoy). 
128 See Kevin S. Huffman, Charter Schools, Equal Protection Litigation, and the New School Reform 
Movement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1290, 1308–09 (1998) (“[T]he nature of charter 
schoolscreated through state legislation, approved by state officials, and designed 
tofulfill state functionssuggests that they are state actors.”). 
129 Id. at 1305 (discussing the entities to which the Fourteenth Amendment applies). 
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can bring a legal action against the private/state actor for redress.130  
But how do we know when a private actor is working under color of 
state law?131  Two recent Ninth Circuit cases, Caviness v. Horizon Com-
munity Learning Center, Inc. and Nampa Classical Academy v. Goesling, 
best illustrate when a private organization, specifically a charter 
school, becomes a state actor for purposes of § 1983. 
In Caviness, the Ninth Circuit considered whether “a private non-
profit corporation” running a public charter school was a state ac-
tor.132  Regarding personnel decisions specifically, the court deter-
mined charter schools in Arizona were not state actors.133  The plain-
tiff, a former teacher and athletic coach at the defendant charter 
school, was fired for having a questionable relationship with a female 
student.134 
Because of allegedly false and defamatory statements made by the 
defendant charter school’s executive director, the plaintiff was una-
ble to secure another teaching job.135  He asked for a “name-clearing” 
hearing on the matter, but the defendant did not respond.136  The 
plaintiff later filed a complaint against the charter school under 
§ 1983, alleging the executive director’s statements, under color of 
state law, deprived him of his liberty interest in finding and obtaining 
work without due process of law.137 
After de novo review of the facts, the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint.  Both courts 
found the defendant charter school was not a state actor for purposes 
of § 1983, and dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(6).138  In deter-
mining whether the defendant charter school acted “under color” of 
state law when firing the plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the 
importance of identifying what function the school served.  Only by 
identifying a private actor’s function could the court determine 
 
130 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
131 The Supreme Court’s state action jurisprudence, specifically the nexus doctrine, may be a 
useful background.  See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (finding that “a 
State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised 
coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, 
that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State”); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & 
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970) (“[A] State is responsible for the discriminatory act of a pri-
vate party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act.”). 
132 Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 2010). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 810. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 811. 
137 Id. 
138 Id.  
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whether “there [was] such a close nexus between the State and the 
challenged action” for purposes of § 1983.139 The mere fact that a 
state statute identifies an entity as a state actor does not mean said en-
tity functions as a state actor in all cases.140  Private entities may be 
state actors for some purposes and not others.141 
Because Arizona exercised very limited control or influence over 
its charter schools, these schools were not state actors in and of them-
selves.  The court held private entities in Arizona may be considered 
state actors for some purposes,142 but Arizona charter schools do not 
act under color of state law in their capacity as employers.143  The 
Ninth Circuit clarified this point by citing an earlier decision where a 
terminated employee sued a private correctional facility in Califor-
nia.144  In that case, California granted the private entity “‘certain 
powers and privileges under the law to allow [it] to function ade-
quately’ as a prison.”145  Though the court tacitly admitted the entity 
functioned as a state actor in some respects, the “relevant inquiry” 
was whether the facility acted under color of state law in its “role as an 
employer.”146  In that case, as in Caviness, the private entity was not a 
state actor in an employment context.147 
This functional distinction (that a private entity may be a state ac-
tor for some purposes and not others148) is vital in portraying charter 
schools as state actors.  Based on the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, a pris-
oner in a private correctional institution could bring a § 1983 suit 
against the prison, because the facility acts under color of state law in 
regard to prisoners’ incarceration.149  Similarly, courts may be more 
likely to recognize private charter schools as acting under color of 
state law if students, rather than employees, bring suits. 
Further, state influence alone can convert private charter schools 
into state actors.  In Nampa Classical Academy, the Ninth Circuit found 
 
139 Id. at 812 (quoting Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 
2008)). 
140 Id. at 814. 
141 Id. at 812–13. 
142 See id. (focusing on the functions of the entities in making this determination). 
143 Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2010) (reject-
ing the plaintiff’s arguments for why charter schools are state actors). 
144 Id. at 813 (citing George v. Pacific–CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 
1996)). 
145 George, 91 F.3d at 1230. 
146 Id. 
147 Id.; Caviness, 590 F.3d at 818. 
148 Caviness, 590 F.3d at 812–13. 
149 See George, 91 F.3d at 1230 (recognizing that an entity could “be a state actor for some 
purposes but not” others). 
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an Idaho charter school did not have standing to sue a fellow state ac-
tor because the charter school itself was a “creature[] of Idaho state 
law that [is] funded by the state, subject to the supervision and con-
trol of the state, and exist[s] at the state’s mercy.”150  Idaho legislators 
passed numerous provisions to regulate charter schools.151  Taken as a 
whole, these provisions “demonstrate[d] that Idaho charter schools 
[were] governmental entities.”152  Based on the Ninth Circuit’s rea-
soning, whether a charter school acts under color of state law will vary 
by state and situation.  In states, like Idaho, that influence policy for 
educational institutions, charter schools may be de facto state actors.  
In states like Arizona, where charter schools have more discretion, 
they may only function under color of state law in specific situations.  
Still, even where charter schools are not de facto state actors, state in-
fluence and intervention can bring a charter school within the pur-
view of § 1983.  Charter schools can and should be considered state 
actors for purposes of protecting minority students.  This classifica-
tion would greatly aid students by securing their rights via Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection. 
B.  Finishing Touches:  Brown v. Board of Education and Palmore v. 
Sidoti as Keys to Resuscitating Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
The Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
jurisprudence is often characterized in terms of anticlassification and 
antisubordination principles.153  “[T]he anticlassification principle 
tolerates practices that are facially neutral but have a disparate impact 
on minorities; but it is intolerant of any use of racial classifica-
tion . . . .”154 In contrast, proponents of the antisubordination princi-
ple are less concerned with the facial classification, and more con-
cerned with protecting members of traditionally disadvantaged 
groups from the “harms of unjust social stratification.”155  Further, be-
cause the antisubordination principle seeks to curb practices that 
 
150 Nampa Classical Acad. v. Goesling, 447 F. App’x 776, 777–78 (9th Cir. 2011). 
151 See id. (explaining why Idaho charter schools are governmental entitites). 
152 Id. at 777. 
153 Proponents of the anticlassification principle believe all racial classifications are unconsti-
tutional on their face, regardless of the classification’s effect on historically marginalized 
groups.  Proponents of the antisubordination principle are concerned with laws that ad-
versely affect historically marginalized groups, rather than whether the law is racially neu-
tral on its face.  See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization:  An Emerging 
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1287–89 (2011) (describing 
these two positions). 
154 Id. at 1288. 
155 Id. 
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“disproportionally harm members of marginalized groups, it can tell 
the difference between benign and invidious discrimination.”156 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court narrowed its analytical focus 
over time, thus losing the benefit of a dual anticlassification and 
antisubordination analysis.  In the 1960s, the Supreme Court began 
shifting away from antisubordination analysis and toward a “general 
presumption that racial classifications are unconstitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”157  Though possible negative impacts on 
racial minorities were considered, racial classification itself became 
taboo.  By the 1970s, the Court had increasingly conflated Brown v. 
Board of Education’s “holding with the presumption against racial clas-
sifications.”158  Even governmental use of racial classifications to bene-
fit minorities (such as affirmative action) received heightened scruti-
ny from the Court based on the well-intentioned but ill-founded view 
that all racial classifications are more likely evil than not.159  More re-
cently, some Supreme Court Justices have implicitly used an anti-
balkanization principle in deciding these cases.  Under this principle, 
the Justices attempt to prevent majority backlash against programs 
that benefit minorities by requiring strong public interest justifica-
tions for these policies.160 
Though a presumption against racial classification was well-
intentioned and useful in a time when laws clearly reflected racial bi-
ases, it is considerably less helpful in combatting facially neutral laws 
that target minorities, or rules that implicitly value White traits while 
disparaging Black ones.  The Supreme Court’s ruling in Palmore v. 
Sidoti reflects an understanding of these dangers.161  Palmore is a child 
custody case.162  The child’s mother (a White woman) had custody, 
but when she re-married a Black man, the child’s father (a White 
man) sued to gain custody.163  The state court sided with the child’s 
father.164  This court’s decision was not based upon the stepfather’s 
race in the strictest sense, but because of the “damaging impact on 
the child from remaining in a racially mixed household.”165 
 
156 Id. at 1289. 
157 Id. at 1290. 
158 Id. at 1291. 
159 See Siegel, supra note 153, at 1291 (discussing the Court’s use of heightened scrutiny for 
racial classifications)  
160 See id. at 1300 (discussing the Justices’ use of the antibalkanization principle). 
161 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
162 Id. at 430. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 431. 
165 Id. at 431–32. 
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The Supreme Court reversed, keying in on the fact that common-
ly held racial biases, if not race itself, motivated the Florida state 
court’s decision.166  In the words of Chief Justice Warren Burger,  
It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic prejudices do not 
exist or that all manifestations of those prejudices have been eliminat-
ed . . . . The question, however, is whether the reality of private biases 
and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible considera-
tions . . . . We have little difficulty concluding that they are not.167   
Whatever negative traits the state court (and society at large) at-
tributed to the child’s Black stepfather were inappropriate considera-
tions to determine custody, especially since the lower court took no 
issue with his qualifications or those of the child’s mother.168 
Courts cannot make decisions based on the dictates of American 
society’s racial bias, whether that bias manifests against a racial group 
or traits associated with that group.  State-funded institutions, like 
public primary and secondary schools, are not exempt from this pro-
hibition.  “Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the 
law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”169 
Racially conscious public school hairstyle prohibitions are an ex-
cellent example of rules that primarily target ethnic minorities and 
ethnic traits.  Unfortunately, the current judicial trend toward eradi-
cating suspect classifications170 with a single-minded focus makes it 
difficult to identify and eliminate rules evocative of the state court’s 
Palmore decision.  To adequately assess the hairstyle prohibitions in 
question, we must return to the Supreme Court’s understanding in 
 
166 See id. at 434 (focusing on “[t]he effects of racial prejudice”). 
167 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
168 Id. at 430. 
169 Id. at 433. 
170 The Supreme Court first suggested that more stringent standards of judicial review 
should be used for certain marginalized groups, including racial minorities, in the fa-
mous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
The Supreme Court’s suspect classification jurisprudence emerged gradually after this 
case, eventually mandating that the highest standard of judicial scrutiny, strict scrutiny, be 
used in consideration of race-based equal protection cases.  “[A]ll race-conscious govern-
mental actions, whether state or federal, benign or discriminatory, when challenged un-
der the Equal Protection Clause [are] subject to the highest standard of constitutional re-
view, strict scrutiny, which Gerald Gunther famously described as “‘strict’ in theory and 
fatal in fact.”  Ashutosh Bhagwat, Affirmative Action and Compelling Interests:  Equal Protection 
Jurisprudence at the Crossroads, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 260, 261 (2002) (citation omitted).  
This theory presumes the Constitution is “color blind” and strikes down governmental ac-
tions that acknowledge race, while largely ignoring facially neutral laws that negatively 
impact minorities.  See Osagie K. Obasogie, Can the Blind Lead the Blind?  Rethinking Equal 
Protection Jurisprudence Through an Empirical Examination of Blind People’s Understanding of 
Race, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 705, 743 (2013) (arguing that the judicial approach to race 
depends on the conception that race is something that is seen). 
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Palmore, and to the quintessential case where both anticlassification 
and antisubordination principles were used to determine whether a 
public primary school policy was unconstitutional under Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection:  Brown v. Board of Education.171 
In Brown, the Supreme Court utilized aspects of both principles to 
outlaw racial segregation in the United States.172  Oliver Brown, the 
plaintiff who lent his name to the case, challenged the so-called Sepa-
rate but Equal Doctrine in Kansas that prohibited his Black child 
from attending a White school.173  Oliver Brown and his fellow plain-
tiffs contended that though White and Black schools were equal on 
paper, in practice White schools were of higher quality.174  Further, 
“[t]he plaintiffs contend[ed] that segregated public schools [were] 
not ‘equal’ and [could] not be made ‘equal.’”175  Because schools 
were equal on their face but discriminatory in practice, the plaintiffs 
were deprived of equal protection of the laws.  The Court ultimately 
agreed with the plaintiffs, ending legalized racial segregation in the 
United States.176  The Court’s reasoning is an excellent study in 
anticlassification and antisubordination principles working in tan-
dem.177 
In analyzing the Separate but Equal Doctrine and its application, 
the Court first looked to whether the law in question engendered in-
equality on its face and found that it did not:  “[T]he Negro and 
white schools involved [were] equalized, or [were] being equalized, 
with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of 
teachers, and other ‘tangible’ factors.”178  Strictly speaking, the law 
did not discriminate between Blacks and Whites.  Taking the policies 
at face value, the racial classifications contained in the Separate but 
Equal Doctrine were not discriminatory.  However, in analyzing the 
law’s effects, the Court acknowledged two very important principles:  
(1) that racial classification in and of itself is sometimes harmful, and 
(2) that laws may appear benign while masking horrible injustice and 
 
171 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (declaring racial segregation in public 
schools, and the Separate but Equal Doctrine, unconstitutional under Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection), enforced, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (reiterating that the re-
spondent public schools should desegregate “with all deliberate speed”). 
172 See Siegel, supra note 153, at 1290 (arguing that both principles were at work in Brown). 
173 Ogletree, supra note 50, at 523. 
174 Brown, 347 U.S. at 488. 
175 Id.  
176 Id. at 495. 
177 Siegel, supra note 153, at 1289 (discussing Brown and the two principles). 
178 Brown, 347 U.S. at 492. 
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targeting traditionally marginalized groups.179  The Court’s “decision, 
therefore, [could] not turn on merely a comparison of these tangible 
factors.”180  Rather, the Supreme Court looked to the effect of segre-
gation on public education.181  Utilizing both anticlassification and 
antisubordination theories, the Court determined the Separate but 
Equal Doctrine violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 
Applying the Brown Court’s two-step anticlassification and 
antisubordination analysis to primary public school hairstyle prohibi-
tions, we find that these facially neutral hairstyle policies mask subor-
dination of Black children’s bodies to a White cultural ideal.  Here, as 
in Brown, the rule itself is not inherently discriminatory.182  In schools 
like Vanessa VanDyke’s, all children would be prohibited from wear-
ing afros, dreadlocks, and small twisted braids, regardless of race.183  
However, as in Brown, “[o]ur decision… cannot turn on merely a 
comparison of these tangible factors . . . . We must look instead to the 
effect of [the policy] itself on public education.”184  Even looking to 
the effect of these hairstyle prohibitions, a modern day proponent of 
a “color blind”185 legal system might miss the significance of a prohibi-
tion on dreadlocks.  These critics, like the courts in Rogers and Pitts, 
claim hairstyle is fluid and that hairstyle prohibitions cannot affect 
races differently.  However, a sociological examination of how blind 
persons, who are racially “color blind” in the most literal sense, iden-
tify and internalize race provides a strong rebuttal to this conten-
tion.186 
 
179 The Supreme Court acknowledged that “[s]egregation of white and colored children in 
public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children . . . [as] the policy of 
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”  
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Further, the decision “cannot 
turn on merely a comparison of . . . tangible factors . . . . We must look instead to the ef-
fect of segregation itself on public education.”  Id. at 492. 
180 Id. at 492. 
181 Id. 
182 Id.  
183 See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text for a discussion of schools that imposed (or 
tried to impose) universal bans on certain Black ethnic hairstyles.  
184 Id.  
185 Proponents of anticlassification analysis in equal protection jurisprudence often believe 
that “the law is colorblind.”  Jacoby, supra note 126, at 1562. 
186 See Obasogie, supra note 170, at 762 (finding that current equal protection jurisprudence 
overemphasizes the importance of visual conceptions of race and lacks “a more sophisti-
cated understanding of the social practices that make certain groups visible targets of dis-
crimination to begin with”). 
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One blind man notes that hair takes on special significance as a 
proxy for race in the dating context.187  “[W]hen someone doesn’t 
know our race,” he says, “they’ll find some way to reach out and 
touch our hair.  People want to know, and that’s the one [racial clue] 
they can always get . . . .”188  In the United States, visual perceptibility 
is inherent to the concept of race.  Even the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
prohibits discrimination based on race without feeling compelled to 
define race.189  Despite the presumptive visual nature of race, racial 
biases based on non-visual cues are alive and well among the blind 
community:  “You can see [someone] kind of pursuing somebody 
[that they find attractive].  And they’ll go for the hair and then they’ll 
change their mind.  They’re always still friendly . . . .  But you’re 
Black.”190  Here, hair texture and hairstyle function as a fundamental 
proxy for race.  “[H]air texture [and hairstyle are] sought out as a 
proxy for the visual cues associated with race as a way to determine 
the terms, limits, and boundaries of social interactions.”191  Race exists 
even in a truly “color blind” community through its integral associa-
tion with hair texture and hairstyle. 
Though hairstyle can change, certain hair textures are associated 
with certain hairstyles.  These hairstyles come to be imbued with as 
much cultural significance as the hair itself.  Afros, afro-puffs, dread-
locks, small braided twists, and cornrows are examples of such hair-
styles.  Racially conscious public school hairstyle prohibitions discrim-
inate against Black students in the same way the “Queue ordinance” 
discriminated against Chinese men in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan.192  Such 
school policies elevate White hairstyles while denoting the inferiority 
of Black hairstyles.  The negative psychological impact on Black chil-
dren is greater when these policies have the sanction of the law.193 
Racially-motivated school dress code policies may not discriminate 
on their face (and may well pass muster under suspect classification 
analysis), but review of these policies based on antisubordination 
concerns reveals that they negatively impact Black children physically 
and psychologically.  Physically, these policies force Black children to 
adopt White hairstyles that are often unsuitable for their hair, and 
 
187 Id. at 751. 
188 Id. 
189 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (declining to define race). 
190 Obasogie, supra note 170, at 751. 
191 Id. 
192 See Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255 (1879) (No. 6,546) (noting that the 
ordiance was only enforced against the Chinese). 
193 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (discussing the psychological impact 
of segregation on Black children). 
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psychologically, these polices tell those children their natural hair is 
unacceptable and wrong.  The presence of racial bias in favor of 
White hair in American society is insufficient to justify these policies.  
A culturally White majority may deem dreadlocks and cornrows “un-
professional” or “distracting,” but such biases cannot be given effect 
by state funded educational institutions.  As the Supreme Court con-
cluded in Palmore, “[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the 
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”194  
Courts should consider antisubordination concerns as dictated in 
Brown, Palmore, and Ho Ah Kow in evaluating the legitimacy of such 
policies.  Close scrutiny reveals that racially conscious school hairstyle 
prohibitions are inherently discriminatory, and negatively impact 
Black students physically, psychologically, and socially. 
SPLIT ENDS:  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE LEGALITY AND 
DESIRABILITY OF PUBLIC SCHOOL HAIRSTYLE PROHIBITIONS 
This comment had twin aims:  to determine whether publicly 
funded primary and secondary schools are legally able to institute ra-
cially conscious hairstyle prohibitions, and to determine whether they 
should be able to do so.  The answer to the latter question is obvious.  
School dress codes that prohibit afros, afro-puffs, dreadlocks, small 
twisted braids, and other culturally Black styles imply the Black body 
is unacceptable, unruly, and unprofessional.  These policies result in 
forced assimilation that is damaging to the psyche of Black children.  
However well-intentioned, these policies subtly say that White traits 
are good while Black traits are bad.  Because this implication is in-
herently discriminatory and damaging, and because these facially 
neutral policies target a historically marginalized and highly visible 
racial group, public school hairstyle prohibitions are unacceptable 
and should be banned. 
Unfortunately, the law has yet to acknowledge this alarming reali-
ty.  Despite evidence that the policies are discriminatory, current un-
derstandings of race in Fourteenth Amendment equal protection ju-
risprudence allow such policies to continue.  Only by utilizing both 
antisubordination and anticlassification perspectives in equal protec-
tion analysis to expand the law’s limited conception of race, can 




194 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
